ACS\u27s Interpretation of the  No Contact Rule  Impedes the Reunification of Families by Schorr, Nanette
Fordham Law Review 
Volume 70 Issue 2 Article 17 
2001 
ACS's Interpretation of the "No Contact Rule" Impedes the 
Reunification of Families 
Nanette Schorr 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Nanette Schorr, ACS's Interpretation of the "No Contact Rule" Impedes the Reunification of Families, 70 
Fordham L. Rev. 441 (2001). 
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol70/iss2/17 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and 
History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Law Review by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham 
Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu. 
ACS's Interpretation of the "No Contact Rule" Impedes the Reunification of 
Families 
Cover Page Footnote 
Nanette Schorr directs the Family Law Unit at Bronx Legal Services, where she has represented parents in 
child protective proceedings for fourteen years. She is also an adjunct instructor at Fordham University 
School of Law. ** I wish to thank Fordham Law Students Tim Benson, Eric Montroy, Lynn Singband and 
Dave Tull, who prepared an extensive memorandum on this subject under the supervision of Professor 
Ann Moynihan in connection with their work in the Stein Program's advanced seminar on legal ethics. 
This article is available in Fordham Law Review: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol70/iss2/17 
ACS'S INTERPRETATION OF THE "NO
CONTACT RULE" IMPEDES THE
REUNIFICATION OF FAMILIES
Nanette Schorr*
INTRODUCTION**
The New York Code of Professional Responsibility DR 7-104
prohibits attorneys from speaking with represented parties about the
matter in controversy without the consent of the respective counsel
for each party, or unless authorized by law.' New York State has
adopted this rule, commonly referred to as the "no contact rule."2
The rule states as follows:
A. During the course of the representation of a client a lawyer shall
not:
1. Communicate or cause another to communicate on the subject of
the representation with a party [he or she] knows to be represented
by a lawyer in that matter unless [he or she] has the prior consent of
the lawyer representing such other party or is authorized by law to
do so.3
On August 13, 1999, the New York City Administration for
Children's Services ("ACS") issued a protocol to its staff, entitled
"Guidelines for ACS Caseworkers in Communicating with
Attorneys."4  The protocol directs caseworkers not to speak to
* Nanette Schorr directs the Family Law Unit at Bronx Legal Services, where she has
represented parents in child protective proceedings for fourteen years. She is also an
adjunct instructor at Fordham University School of Law.
** I wish to thank Fordham Law students Tim Benston, Eric Montroy, Lynn
Singband, and Dave Tull, who prepared an extensive memorandum on this subject
under the supervision of Professor Ann Moynihan in connection with their work in
the Stein Program's advanced seminar on legal ethics.
1. Various rationales have been advanced for this rule. These include protection
of attorneys from predatory practices by adverse attorneys, and protection of
represented laypeople from overreaching by opposing counsel. Stephen Sinaiko, F-r-
Parte Communication and the Corporate Adversary: A New Approach, 66 N.Y.U. L
Rev. 1456,1462 (1991) (discussing various purposes of the "'no contact rule").
2. There appears to be no New York case law that directly addresses the
question of whether the "no contact rule" applies to communication between parent
attorneys and ACS caseworkers in child protective proceedings.
3. N.Y. Code of Prof'l Responsibility DR 7-104 (1999): N.Y. Comp. Codes R. &
Regs. tit. 22, § 120035 (1999).
4. Memorandum from Gerald Harris et al., The City of New York
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attorneys representing parents in child protective matters about any
issue of substance related to the case.' In relevant part, the procedure
states: "Other than greeting the attorneys for parents and foster
parents ('Parent Attorneys'), the ACS worker should not discuss the
case with the Parent Attorneys either in person or by telephone. 6
While the memorandum forbids communication between ACS
caseworkers and parent attorneys, it permits contact between ACS
caseworkers and law guardians for children.7 Specifically, it permits
disclosure by the ACS caseworkers of factual information regarding
"the child's progress, treatment programs and ACS' [sic] broad plan
for the child."' ACS caseworkers are also permitted to refer the law
guardians to the foster care agency worker working with the child so
that they may obtain additional information.9 In permitting this
contact, the protocol refers to its intent "to highlight the objective of
coordinated efforts by ACS caseworkers and attorneys as they pursue
the shared goal of effectively representing the Commissioner and
securing the best interests of children."10
While ACS's policy makes no specific reference to the "no contact
rule," it seems reasonable to infer from the policy's directive to
caseworkers to refer all inquiries made by parent counsel to Division
of Legal Services ("DLS") attorneys" that ACS intends to eliminate
all direct communication between caseworkers and attorneys for
parents. This article argues that the "no contact rule" does not apply
to these types of communications and that, in the spirit of its stated
commitment to further the best interests of the families whose mission
it is to serve, ACS should abrogate this policy and open up the lines of
communication between parent attorneys and ACS caseworkers. 2
Administration for Children's Services, to DCP, DFCPS, DLS, DCA, and ACM Staff
(Aug. 13, 1999) (on file with the Fordham Law Review).
5. Id. at 3-4.
6. Id. at 3.
7. Id. at 2.
8. Id.
9. Id. at cover page.
10. Id.
11. Attorneys who represent ACS in child protective proceedings are members of
ACS's Division of Legal Services.
12. See Recommendations of the Conference on Achieving Justice: Parents and the
Child Welfare System, 70 Fordham L. Rev. 337, 344 (section 3.2.4) (ethics working
group) (indicating that the Code permits such contact without prior consent, and
recommending that, as part of their representational duties, attorneys for parents
should speak directly with caseworkers from ACS and voluntary agencies and that
ACS should develop a detailed protocol identifying specific areas parent attorneys
and caseworkers are permitted to discuss).
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I. ACS's PROTOCOL EXCLUDES PARENT ATTORNEYS FROM
CRUCIAL CASE PLANNING
ACS's self-described mission is to "ensure the safety and well-being
of all the children of New York."' 3 ACS has set forth, in its new
placement principles, the proposition that "all families deserve to be
involved in their children's placement in foster care."'4 "Parents must
be fully informed about the reasons for their child's placement into
care, the conditions for reunification, and the timeframes for meeting
such conditions," and "[p]arents must be encouraged to actively
participate in family case planning conferences as soon as possible
after placement and at other critical points during the child's stay in
foster care."15
These goals cannot be realized without the active interaction
between parents and caseworkers, working together to develop case
plans and implement them in a dynamic fashion.' 6 Case plans must be
developed within thirty days of the time a child enters foster care and
updated regularly (i.e., at minimum, every six months, but more
frequently, if there is a significant change in circumstances). 7
While parents may bring representatives, including attorneys, to
case planning conferences, and are entitled by statute to be notified of
this right, 8 ACS does not permit caseworkers to communicate with
parent attorneys nor does it allow parent attorneys (or any other
counsel) to attend the Seventy-Two Hour Child Safety Conference,
which is the first case conference ACS elects to hold after removal of
a child. Yet, central to the extension of placement and permanency
hearings is the court's examination of whether the parent has
complied with the service plan.19
II. PARENT ATTORNEYS SERVE A CRUCIAL ROLE IN REUNITING
FAMILIES
Attorneys for parents play a significant and multi-faceted role in the
process of family reunification. Parents need strong advocates at all
13. ACS Introduction, at http://www.ci.nyc.ny.usthtml/acshtmlwhatwedo
introduction.html (on file with the Fordhamn Law Review).
14. What We Do: ACS Permanency & Planning Principles, at
http://www.ci.nyc.ny.uslhtmllacslhtmlhvhatwedopp-place.htm (on file with the
Fordham Law Review).
15. Id.
16. See, e.g., N.Y. Soc. Serv. Law § 409-e(2) (McKinney 1992) (mandating
preparation of case plans by the social services district in active consultation with the
child's parent or guardian).
17. Id. § 409-e(1).
18. N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act § 1055(b)(vi)(B) (McKinney Supp. 2001).
19. See id § 1055(b)(iv)(A).
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stages of a child protective problem-from pre-removal through
termination of parental rights. As was discussed in a recent article
published in the Fordham Urban Law Journal:
The attorneys who represent parents in child abuse and neglect
proceedings in the New York City Family Court ... system enter the
lives of parents at critical moments of emotional crisis. These are
parents who are too poor to provide food and clothing for
themselves and their children, or cannot find affordable, adequate
housing for their families, or have been abused themselves, or
cannot overcome an addiction to drugs or alcohol.... These are
parents who desperately need a zealous advocate both in court, to
ensure their voices are heard, and out of court, to ensure they
receive the services they need to get their children back.21
Assignment of court-appointed counsel in New York City typically
ends after a finding of abuse or neglect and the placement of the child
in foster care.' However, a parent may be found abusive or neglectful
after the fact-finding hearing, in which case he or she would have to
"comply with a court-ordered 'service plan' before [his or] her
children may be returned home."'  A service plan "may include
parenting classes, drug counseling, domestic violence counseling, or
even securing a new home appropriate for [his or ] her family."24 It is
during a period in between court proceedings such as this (e.g., post-
disposition, but before extension of placement) that parent attorneys
could engage in crucial advocacy activities to assist parents in meeting
service plan requirements, adjusting service plans where appropriate,
and moving the plan forward expeditiously.
At least until ACS changes the permanency planning goal to
adoption, there is a presumption that all parties share a goal of family
reunification, though the parties may differ on the mechanism, speed
of attainment, and impediments to achieving that goal. To the extent
that such a goal is shared, parent attorneys should be recognized as
crucial players in the joint endeavor.
20. Sheri Bonstelle & Christine Schlessler, Comment, Adjourning Justice: New
York State's Failure to Support Assigned Counsel Violates the Rights of Families in
Child Abuse and Neglect Proceedings, 28 Fordham Urb. L.J. 1151 (2001).
21. Id. at 1151-52.
22. Mark Green, Pub. Advocate for the City of N.Y. & C-PLAN: Child Planning
and Advocacy Now, Accountability Project, Inc., Justice Denied: The Crisis in Legal
Representation of Birth Parents in Child Protective Proceedings, at v (May 2000).
23. Bonstelle & Schlessler, supra note 20, at 1189.
24. Id.
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III. ACS CASEWORKERS SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED
REPRESENTED "PARTIES" TO THE ACTION FOR PURPOSES OF THE
"No CONTAT RULE"
A. Application of the "No Contact Rule" to Government Entities
Involves a Balancing Test
Where two parties are involved in a legal controversy, an attorney
for one of the parties is prohibited by the "no-contact rule" from
contacting the adverse party without the permission of that party's
attorney.2
In Niesig v. Team I,' the New York State Court of Appeals held
that "corporate employees, whose acts or omissions in the matter
under inquiry are binding on the corporation (in effect the
corporation's 'alter egos')," 27 are represented "parties" for purposes
of applying the "no contact rule."'  The court further held that
employees whose acts or omissions on the matter under inquiry can be
"imputed to the corporation for purposes of its liability," as well as
those "employees implementing the advice of counsel," are also
"parties" for purposes of the rule.29
In Frey v. Department of Health and Human Services, ' the court
considered the application of the "no contact rule" where the
defendant was a government entity. As in Niesig, the term "party"
was defined as encompassing those employees, "who are the alter
egos of the entity, that is, those individuals who can bind it to a
decision or settle controversies on its behalf."' Explaining its
decision to bar ex parte contact by plaintiffs' counsel with high-level
managerial employees who made the employment decision at issue in
the litigation, while permitting informal contact with other employees
who could provide relevant information in the case, the District Court
for the Eastern District of New York indicated its agreement with the
balancing approach adopted earlier by the Second Circuit in N.Y.
State Association for Retarded Children v. Carey.2 That balancing
25. N.Y. Code of Prof'l Responsibility DR 7-104(A)(i) (N.Y. State Bar Ass'n
1999).
26. 558 N.E.2d 1030 (N.Y. 1990).
27. Id at 1035.
28. Id.
29. Id
30. 106 F.R.D. 32 (E.D.N.Y. 1985).
31. Id. at 35.
32. 706 F.2d 956 (2d. Cir 1983); see also Frey, 106 F.R.D. at 36 (denying order to
preclude plaintiffs' counsel from questioning employees of defendant state school
based on the rationale that the danger of such an interrogation was outweighed by its
potential to aid in arriving at the truth).
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approach involved weighing the competing interests between
"plaintiffs need for information in the possession of [defendant] and
the protection of the party-defendant from adverse counsel obtaining
uncounselled [sic] disclosures."33
Applying the balancing test, the Frey court held that permitting a
government entity to block plaintiffs from interviewing potential
witnesses under the "no contact rule," except through costly discovery
procedures, might frustrate the right of an individual plaintiff with
limited resources to a fair trial. This, in turn, might have the effect of
deterring other litigants from pursuing their legal remedies. 5
Similarly, in McKitty v. Board of Education, Nyack Union Free School
District,36 the District Court for the Southern District of New York
held that plaintiffs counsel may interview government employees
holding "non-managerial and non-controlling positions," but may not
make ex parte contact with employees who had "the power to bind
the defendants or settle controversies on their behalf."
37
B. The Fact That Particular Types of Communication Between an
A CS Caseworker and a DLS Attorney Are Privileged Does Not Make
ACS Caseworkers Represented "Parties" for All Purposes, Nor Does It
Privilege All Their Communications With DLS Attorneys
In reaching its decision, the court in McKitty considered whether its
holding ran afoul of Upjohn Co. v. United States,38 where the United
States Supreme Court "held that even low and middle level corporate
employees are covered by the attorney-client privilege."39
Determining that its holding was not inconsistent with the decision in
Upjohn, the McKitty court opted to follow the Supreme Court's
reasoning,4" which states:
The [attorney-client] privilege only protects disclosure of
communications; it does not protect disclosure of the underlying
facts by those who communicated with the attorney: "[Tihe
protection of the privilege extends only to communications and not
33. Frey, 106 F.R.D. at 36.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. No. 86 Civ. 3176, 1987 WL 28791 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 16, 1987).
37. Id. at *4.
38. Id. at *2-*3.
39. In Upjohn, information was found to have been needed from lower- and mid-
level management to supply a basis for legal advice concerning company compliance
with various regulations. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 394 (1981). The
Supreme Court found that the employees were sufficiently aware they were being
questioned so that the corporation could obtain legal advice relative to practices
which could be illegal. Id. All employees of the company were made aware of the
legal implications of the questionnaire at issue. Id. Under these circumstances the
Court held that the communications at issue (i.e., responses to the questionnaire)
were protected against compelled disclosure. Id. at 395.
40. McKitty, 1987 WL 28791, at *3.
[Vol. 70
2001] NO CONTACT RULE 447
to facts. A fact is one thing and a communication concerning that
fact is an entirely different thing. The client cannot be compelled to
answer the question, 'What did you say or write to the attorney?'
but may not refuse to disclose any relevant fact within his
knowledge merely because he incorporated a statement of such fact
into his communication to his attorney.'
Since child protective line caseworkers can neither bind the
agency,42 nor bring liability on it if their actions are not taken pursuant
to municipal policy or custom,43 it is only on rare occasions they would
be found, under the holding in Niesig," to be represented "parties"
covered by the "no-contact rule." Federal courts have consistently
granted child protective caseworkers qualified immunity from liability
for almost all acts45 taken in the course of their employment, with the
exception of intentional violations of due process rights."
Even if communications between ACS caseworkers and DLS
attorneys participating in child protective proceedings were subject to
the attorney-client privilege (though the relationship between them is
not a traditional attorney-client relationship), the underlying facts
upon which those communications are based (e.g., the parent-child
relationship, reunification efforts, etc.) would not fall within the scope
41. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 395 (emphasis and alteration in original) (quoting
Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Electric, 205 F. Supp. 830,831 (E.D. Pa. 1962)).
42. To this writer's knowledge, there are no documents in the public domain that
specifically set forth the responsibilities of caseworkers at each level of the ACS
hierarchy with regard to decision-making for individual families. It is public
knowledge, however, that ACS has a comprehensive system of supervision that
consists of a significant number of levels past the line caseworkers. It is also this
writer's experience that, while caseworker input is solicited by supervisory personnel,
the power to make decisions on crucial issues such as permanency planning goals and
timing of family reunification ultimately remains with supervisors, and line
caseworkers cannot make those decisions independently. Moreover, it is rare that
higher level ACS supervisory personnel appear in Family Court on any particular
matter. If personnel from a higher level were to appear, however, for purposes of
binding the agency, they may be presumed to be represented "parties" on those
occasions, and the prohibitions of the "no contact rule" would therefore apply. See
McKitny, 1987 WL 28791, at *2; Frey v. Department of Health and Human Servs., 106
F.R.D. 32, 36 (E.D.N.Y. 1985).
43. Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994), "for a court to impose liability on a municipal
defendant" such as ACS, it "must identify a municipal policy or custom from which
the alleged injury arose." See, e.g., Tenenbaum v. Williams, 193 F.3d 581, 597 (2d.
Cir. 1999).
44. Neisig v. Team I, 558 N.E.2d 1030 (1990).
45. See, e.g., Tenenbaum, 193 F.3d at 597 (affording qualified immunity to child
welfare workers against plaintiffs' procedural due process claims).
46. Cf. Sundbye v. Ogunleye, 3 F. Supp. 2d 254,261 (E.D.N.Y 1998) (holding that
even intentional torts committed by government actors are not actionable as
substantive due process claims, unless the torts are arbitrary and discriminatory or
shock the conscience). In Sundbye, qualified immunity was not granted to the
caseworker because her alleged coercion of a mother into relinquishing custody of her
daughter in disregard of her due process rights could not be considered objectively
reasonable. Id. at 265-66.
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of privilege, as delineated in Upjohn,'47 and should, therefore,
constitute areas of legitimate direct discussion"8 between parent
attorneys and ACS caseworkers.
IV. APPLICATION OF THE "No CONTACT RULE" TO
COMMUNICATION BETWEEN PARENT ATTORNEYS AND ACS
CASEWORKERS IMPEDES EFFICIENT RESOLUTION OF CHILD
PROTECTIVE CASES AND SLOWS DOWN THE REUNIFICATION OF
FAMILIES
Prohibiting communication between parent attorneys and ACS
caseworkers does not serve the purposes of the "no contact rule,"
since the rule's purposes49 relate to overreaching, not to protection of
a party from revelation of the underlying facts in a case.
The purpose of child protective proceedings is not to find fault with
ACS caseworkers who, in any event, remain mostly immune from the
threat of lawsuits, but to reunite families. Caseworkers have
obligations to facilitate preservation of the family unit by arranging
parental visitation, helping parents obtain appropriate services, and
providing information to parents regarding family preservation and
reunification."
A caseworker's fulfillment of his or her role requires effective
communication with the parents.' Such communication ought to
involve the parent attorney, who functions as the parent
representative, and therefore, when necessary, acts in the parent's
47. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981).
48. As the court in McKitty held, Upjohn does not protect the corporate employee
from factual disclosures made by its employees, but inquiry may not be made of the
employee as to what he or she told defendants' attorney. McKitty v. Board of Educ.,
Nyack Union Free Sch. Dist., No. 86 Civ. 3176, 1987 WL 28791, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Dec.
16, 1987).
49. See Sinaiko, supra note 1, at 1462 (discussing the various purposes of the rule).
50. See N.Y. Soc. Serv. Law § 409-a (McKinney 1992); About ACS Policies, at
http://www.ci.nyc.us/html/acs/htmllwhatwedo/principles.parent.html (on file with the
Fordham Law Review). Section 409-a(1)(a) requires a social services official to
provide preventive services to a child and his or her family, in accordance with the
family's service plan. The relevant provision states in pertinent part:
[U]pon a finding by such official that (i) the child will be placed or continued
in foster care unless such services are provided and that it is reasonable to
believe that by providing such services the child will be able to remain with
or be returned to his [or her] family ......
§ 409-a(l)(a). Preventive services include the following, which are all described in
detail in N.Y. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 18, 423.2 (2000): case management; case planning;
casework contacts; daycare services; homeworker services; housekeeper/chore
services; family planning services; home management services; clinical services; parent
aide services; day services to children; parent training; transportation services;
emergency cash or goods; emergency shelter; and housing services (rent subsidies,
including payment or arrears or any other assistance necessary to obtain adequate
housing).
51. About ACS Policies, at http:/www.ci.nyc.uslhtml/acs/html/whatwedo/
principles-parent.html (on file with the Fordham Law Review).
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stead. When the parent attorney contacts a caseworker on his or her
client's behalf, the purpose of the contact is to resolve issues impeding
the family from being reunited. The attorney might contact the
caseworker to determine the parent's responsibilities and confirm his
or her clients' rights and obligations, or to facilitate resolution of
potential impediments to service plan provision or compliance.
Prohibiting direct contact between parent attorneys and ACS
caseworkers not only hinders the reunification process, but does so
needlessly, since the purposes of the "no contact rule" are not served
by its application in this context.
To the extent ACS caseworkers assume the role of service
providers,5 2 they do not fulfill the definition of "alter ego" in an
adversarial relationship, as noted in Frey.53 In fact, if communication
between the parent attorney and a caseworker results in an admission
by the caseworker about the government's failure to satisfy its
obligations, the government may even benefit from such an admission
by focusing on remedying any errors that may have been made by the
caseworker and figuring out how best to provide services to the
family. Indeed, it is the government's duty (similar to its duty in a
criminal prosecution) to bring out the truth of the situation at hand
and safeguard a just outcome to the proceedings, regardless of which
party prevails.54  Allowing the parent attorney to communicate
directly with caseworkers recognizes this obligation of neutrality that
the government owes both sides, distinguishing child protective cases
from standard adversarial civil litigation cases.
An additional reason for allowing direct contact between parent
attorneys and caseworkers arises from the fact that caseworkers in the
child protective system, acting under their supervisor's directives,
have broad discretion when taking action to achieve what is in the
best interests of the child.5" By expanding the opportunities for
communication between parents and caseworkers, parent attorneys
can play a crucial role in assisting parents to express their needs and,
thereby, help level the power imbalance between the parents and the
caseworkers.
Parents need an advocate not only to represent them in court, but
also to manage the court-ordered directives they have been given and
52. If children are removed from their family, caseworkers must provide
supportive services during the temporary placement, coupled with a plan for how the
family will be reunited. N.Y. Soc. Serv. Law § 409.
53. Frey v. Department of Health and Human Servs., 106 F.R.D. 32,35 (E.D.N.Y.
1985) (stating that "alter ego" analysis applies only to those corporate officers with
the authority to bind the company).
54. Id. at 37.
55. When service plans have been satisfied, ACS decision-makers determine
whether, or if, children should be reunited with their parents. While decisions are
subject to Family Court review pursuant to N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act § 1055 (McKinney
1999) and adjustment, the opinion of social service officials is accorded due deference.
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help them navigate through the child protective system. In this
context, attorneys may advocate for fair case plans, assist parents in
complying with court orders, and help manage the overall progress
toward reunification. 6 Parents often have difficulty negotiating
conflicting requirements of treatment programs, parent-child visits,
and work obligations, identifying and retaining affordable and
appropriate housing, and integrating themselves into their children's
educational and treatment programs. Moreover, many parents
involved with the child welfare system are required to participate in
the Work Experience Program ("WEP") or have jobs that restrict
access to telephones during the work day. Permitting the direct
involvement of parent attorneys in case plan implementation through
communication with caseworkers and attendance at case planning
meetings together with their clients can aid in the speedy resolution of
such matters and facilitate reunification of the parents and their
children.
CONCLUSION
ACS's policy of prohibiting caseworkers from communicating with
parent attorneys inhibits the reunification of families and, hence, the
full engagement of parents in the planning process. ACS's openness
to its caseworkers communicating with children's law guardians
reflects its opinion that direct contact between its caseworkers and
lawyers for opposing parties in the proceedings is not only necessary,
but productive. The prohibitive policy of ACS with respect to parent
attorneys shuts them out of an important avenue of advocacy for
parents and shuts parents out of the opportunities such advocacy
could have otherwise provided to them. Since ACS caseworkers are
not represented "parties" pursuant to the New York Code of
Professional Responsibility DR 7-104, there is no firm legal grounding
for a policy precluding direct communication between parent
attorneys and caseworkers. The policy should be revisited and
revoked.
56. For example, if the parents have been referred to a therapy provider to whom
they cannot relate, or a provider who is ill-suited to meet the requirements of the
service plan, the parent attorney can frame this issue for the caseworker. In addition,
the parent attorney can troubleshoot difficulties between the parents and the foster
parents with the caseworker. The parent attorney can articulate skillfully the
particular impediments the parents face in meeting the service plan requirements and
advocate for much needed assistance. The parent attorney can convey general
objections or concerns about the family service plan.
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